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TOW ARD A "NEW DEAL" FOR COPYRIGHT 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Pamela Samuelson*· 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT. By Jessica L itman. Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books. 2001. Pp. 208. Cloth, $25. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jessica Litman1 believes the public needs a very good copyright 
lawyer, and if I have not mistaken her intentions, she is volunteering 
for the job (pp. 70-73). A century of Congressional deference to 
industry-negotiated compromises has produced, she argues, a copy­
right law that is both incomprehensible and unfair.2 This incompre­
hensibility might be tolerable if copyright law governed only commer­
cial relations among industry participants, all of whom have copyright 
counsel. To the extent that copyright law applies to the conduct of or­
dinary persons,3 its incomprehensibility presents serious difficulties.4 
Moreover, to the extent that copyright law makes illegal many ordi­
nary activities of individuals5 - for example, making private copies of 
music for oneself or to share with a friend or forwarding articles to 
friends via the Internet - it has become unfair as well (pp. 19, 28). As 
the public's copyright lawyer, Jessica Litman advises us not to accept 
the current deal (p. 20). In Digital Copyright, she outlines a framework 
for a copyright law that would be a new and better deal for the public 
and would be short, comprehensible, and normative in character 
(pp. 180-84). 
While Litman does not advocate lawlessness until the new deal has 
been adopted, she makes clear that she does not object to widespread 
noncompliance with copyright law in the meantime. In fact, the pub-
* Chancellor's Professor of Law and Information Management, University of California 
at Berkeley. B.A. 1971, University of Hawaii; J.D. 1976, Yale. - Ed. 
1. Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. 
2. Litman has harsh words for current copyright law, which she characterizes as "com­
plex, internally inconsistent, wordy, and arcane," as well as unfair. P. 19. 
3. See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of 
copyright to ordinary people. 
4. Litman discusses these difficulties in chapters 4, 8, and 12. 
5. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text for more details as to Litman's argu­
ment. 
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lic's noncompliance with strict copyright rules fuels Litman's hopes for 
eventual change (p. 194). People do not obey laws they don't believe 
in, she argues, and governments find it difficult to enforce laws that 
lack public support (p. 112). Therefore, if something has to change, 
Litman believes it will be copyright law, not the behavior of the public. 
Digital Copyright is Litman's paean to a future in which copyright will 
once again be a component of the nation's enlightened information 
policy. 
As will become evident (if it isn't already), Litman's perspective on 
copyright law and my own are quite similar. Yet Litman's work is dis­
tinctive in several respects: in her informed historical perspective on 
copyright law and its legislative policy; her remarkable ability to 
translate complicated copyright concepts and their implications into 
plain English; her willingness to study, understand, and take seriously 
what ordinary people think copyright law means; and her creativity in 
formulating alternatives to the present copyright quagmire.6 Perhaps it 
is too much to ask that Digital Copyright also provide concrete strate­
gies for transforming the copyright legislative process so that the ,new 
deal of copyright would become feasible. It is difficult, however, to 
come away from this book without wishing Litman had the ingenuity 
to be the public's chief strategist for achieving the new deal as well. 
II. COPYRIGHT POLICY AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Much of Litman's career has been devoted to studying and writing 
about the legislative process for making copyright policy.7 She is one 
of the few living .persons familiar with the entire legislative history -
some twenty years' worth of materials - of the Copyright Act of 1976. 
One might initially have thought that the past hundred years of copy-
6. This is not to say that Litman is the only creative copyright scholar of the day. In fact, 
the field of copyright scholarship is alive with talent, much of which focuses on digital copy­
right issues. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 122-41 
(2000); Y ochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The Poli­
tics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997); Julie E. 
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 
MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the 
Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Opera­
tors, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlap­
ping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Demo.cratic 
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). I confess to contributing to this discussion as well, 
although often in venues outside of the law review literature. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Global Information Economy, 39 COMM. ACM 23 (Jan. 
1996); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED 134 (Jan. 1996). 
7. See, e.g. , Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological 
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989). 
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right lawmaking would be a very abstruse subject with little or no 
relevance to current digital copyright debates. In Digital Copyright, 
Litman shows that this history has considerable significance and, in 
fact, is at the heart of the problem. 
A key legislative development of the past century is the evolution 
of a pattern of congressional activity on making copyright law and 
policy. About one hundred years ago, says Litman, 
Congress got into the habit of revising copyright law by encouraging rep­
resentatives of the industries affected by copyright to hash out among 
themselves what changes needed to be made and then present Congress 
with the text of appropriate legislation. By the 1920's, the process was 
sufficiently entrenched that whenever a member of Congress came up 
with a legislative proposal without going through the cumbersome pre­
legislative process .of multiparty negotiations, the affected industries 
united to block the bill. (p. 20) 
Litman observes that this process "generates legislation with some 
predictable features" (pp. 23-24). For one thing, established industry 
players will not support any bill that would leave them worse off than 
under current law. Second, these players will frequently characterize 
the state of current law as though it already favors their position, the 
current law being the baseline against which negotiations will occur. 
Third, negotiations tend to result in very specific and detailed rules 
that resolve the main concerns of the players at that stage of the indus­
try's history. The first two of these features tend to tilt copyright law in 
the direction of ever stronger protection, while the third contributes to 
the law's incomprehensibility. In addition, "[t]his type of drafting pro­
cess makes it exceedingly difficult to speak of legislative intent if by 
legislative intent one means the substantive intent of members of 
Congress" or to discern "any overall purpose pervading the text of the 
statute" (p. 53). 
Delegation of legislative drafting to affected industry groups has 
some undeniable benefits. Copyright industry representatives obvi­
ously have a much better understanding of the likely impacts of par­
ticular rules for their industry than do members of Congress (p. 61 ). 
Insofar as the affected industry groups are able to reach consensus on 
legislation, Congress can have confidence that this will produce work­
able results. Congress may also assume that the resulting legislation 
must adequately balance the interests of the affected parties; other­
wise the compromise would not have been achieved.8 Delegation of 
authority to the industry thus not only takes advantage of industry ex­
pertise, but it also makes lawmaking on copyright issues politically 
feasible (p. 73). 
8. Litman says that "while it is easy to claim that the interplay among all of the interests 
affected by copyright provides a proxy for the public interest, the statute that this interplay 
produces demonstrates that this isn't so." P. 73. 
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This pattern of industry-negotiated and industry-drafted legislation 
also has negative consequences. Among the most serious is that 
emerging industries - along with those that have yet to be invented 
- do not have a seat at the negotiating table, and hence their interests 
will generally not be taken into account in the process of crafting revi­
sions to the law (p. 62). Moreover, to the extent that established indus­
try players perceive emerging industries as threats to their hegemony, 
they will be inclined to craft legislation granting them advantages over 
these rivals (pp. 144-45). 
Litman gives both past and contemporary examples of this phe­
nomenon. In the early days of the sound recording and motion picture 
industries, for example, these nascent industries did not have a seat at 
the negotiating table, and they consequently had no influence over 
rules adopted without attention to their interests or in order to disad­
vantage them (p. 39). Now that these industries have become estab­
lished players, they exercise their considerable clout in the legislative 
process to disadvantage upstart Internet-savvy rivals, as evidenced in 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").9 
Litman explains that disadvantaging upstart rivals is much easier 
now than it was thirty years ago because of a major restructuring of 
U.S. copyright law in 1976. The Copyright Act of 1909 and its prede­
cessor statutes ·granted different sets of exclusive rights to different 
kinds of works.10 The narrow crafting of the 1909 Act's exclusive rights 
provisions often meant that a new technology or industry escaped li­
ability because Congress had not anticipated it.11 The law was 
amended numerous times to take new technologies or industries into 
account, sometimes the goal being to provide the new industry with 
copyright protection12 and sometimes to extend the rights of an exist­
ing industry so that the emergent industry had to pay for its use of 
copyrighted materials.° The Copyright Act of 1976 adopted a far sim­
pler structure in which virtually all works were accorded the same set 
of five exclusive rights,14 which were qualified by a series of very spe-
9. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), the relevant provisions of which are now 
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-04. The DMCA is discussed at length in Digital Copyright, par­
ticularly in chapter 9. 
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1976). 
11. See, e.g. , White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that 
piano roll recordings did not infringe copyright in musical compositions). 
· 
12. See, e.g. , CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW§ 1.04, at 11 (2d ed. 1991) (noting 
that motion pictures were added to the subject matter of copyright in 1912). 
13. See pp. 39-40 (explaining that copyright law was amended to give owners of copy­
rights in musical compositions the right to control mechanical reproductions of their works 
in sound recordings). 
14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Some works (e.g., sound recordings) enjoy some but not all 
of these exclusive rights. See id. §§ 106(4), 106(5). Some works (e.g., sound recordings) have 
special exclusive rights privileges. See id. §§ 106(6), 106A. 
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cific exceptions.15 Libraries, veterans' groups, and nonprofit horticul­
tural organizations were among the groups that managed to persuade 
Congress to exempt some of their activities from copyright law.16 
Litman argues that the 1976 Act dramatically changed copyright 
law's baseline presumption from one in which upstarts often found 
shelter because existing rights were narrowly crafted to one in which 
upstarts were likely to run afoul of a broad exclusive right. In the post-
1976 era, upstarts rarely qualify for an existing exception because the 
need for such an exception was not recognized in 1976 (p. 37). This 
pattern of broad rights and narrow limitations is replicated in the new 
DMCA rules outlawing acts of circumvention of technical measures 
used by copyright owners to protect access to their works and outlaw­
ing circumvention technologies.17 
As serious as may be the exclusion of emerging industries from the 
copyright lawmaking process and the impact of the restructured copy­
right law for emerging industries, this is not Litman's main concern in 
Digital Copyright. Rather, her primary concern is with the impact of 
the current law on the activities of ordinary people, particularly as re­
gards use of digital information on the Internet. The public has also 
been excluded from the copyright legislative process. To the extent 
that copyright law applies to private activities of members of the pub­
lic, this exclusion is unacceptable (p. 116). The broad rights/narrow ex­
ceptions structure of the 1976 Act arguably disadvantages members of 
the public just as it does emerging industries. Moreover, the copyright 
industry's sense of ownership of the copyright policy process - and 
Congress's acquiescence in this, owing at least in part to their being 
the source of generous campaign contributions - has erected a seri­
ous obstacle to reforming the current legislative process.18 
15. 17 u.s.c. §§ 107-22 (2000). 
16. See id. §§ 108 (granting exception for library and archival uses of copyrighted 
works), 110(6), 110(10) (exempting some performances of some copyrighted works in the 
course of functions sponsored by nonprofit horticultural organizations or veterans groups). 
Only the fair use provision has sufficient generality that emerging or future industries can 
invoke it as a shelter for their activities. See id. § 107; see also infra note 66 for examples of 
the successful assertion of fair use as a shelter for new technologies. 
17. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(l)(A), (a)(2), (b)(l) (2000) (granting broad rights); 
1201(c)-G) (containing narrow exceptions). 
18. Litman mentions the influence of copyright industry campaign contributions. P. 62. 
Litman gives this example of the copyright industry's sense of entitlement to control the 
copyright policy agenda: 
Allen Adler, the chief lobbyist for the book publishers group, was frankly resentful that the 
Commerce Committee had dared to insist on exercising jurisdiction in the first place [during 
the legislative process leading up to enactment of the DMCA). He found it outrageous that 
Commerce Committee members, who had far less experience on copyright bills than their 
colleagues on the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, would insist that the content 
community make a deal that would satisfy libraries, universities, or consumer electronics 
manufacturers . . . .  [C]ontent lobbyists made the rounds, characterizing library, university, 
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The public can be forgiven for thinking that copyright law simply 
doesn't apply to their ordinary activities. After all, most of the exclu­
sive rights of the 1976 Act specifically regulate public acts - the right 
to control distribution of copies to the public and public performances 
and displays - not private ones.19 Private noncommercial copying of 
copyrighted materials has generally been deemed fair use following 
the Supreme Court's Sony Betamax ruling under which private non­
commercial copying is presumed to be fair.20 Insofar as the public un­
derstands copyright law, the principal norm they grasp is that it is for­
bidden . .to commercialize someone's work, but not to make private, 
noncommercial uses of it. If the public's conception of copyright law 
aligns with what the law actually provides, there should be no prob­
lem. 
So, either something has dramatically changed to put the public so 
much at risk or Litman has gone off the deep end. Litman argues that 
the digitalization of information and the rise of global networks such 
as the Internet have presented an occasion for a transformed concep­
tion of copyright law's scope (pp. 14, 25-26) .  Notwithstanding the Sony 
Betamax decision, copyright industries regard private copying of copy­
righted materials as infringements,21 especially when the works are 
available in digital form, because of the new licensing models under 
development to charge for such uses.22 If private copying threatens 
copyright industry markets, the fair use defense arguably crumbles.23 
Moreover, in an act of "breathtaking hubris" (p. 30), copyright in­
dustry supporters have embraced the view that copyright owners are 
entitled to control all access to and uses of copyrighted works in digital 
form because each act involves reproductions of the. work in the ran-
and consumer electronics proposals as scandalous, unprecedented, and unabashedly greedy. 
P. 140. 
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)-(5) (2000). Litman briefly mentions these limitations. P. 71. 
20. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). The Court 
went on to say that this presumption should only be overcome if there was proof of a mean­
ingful likelihood of harm to copyright markets. Id. I will refer to this case in the text as Sony 
Betamax. 
21. See, e.g., COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMMS. BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 129-39 (2000) 
(hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA] (discussing private copying); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting 
Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995). 
22. See, e.g., Report of W9rking Group on Intellectual Property Rights of Information 
Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property Rjghts and the National Information Infra­
structure 82 (Sept. 1995) (hereinafter White Paper] (arguing that there is less need for fair 
use because of the emergence of new licensing models for digital information). 
23. The fair use provision directs courts to consider harm not only to actual markets but 
also to potential markets for the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Am. Geo­
physical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing emergence of licensing 
system for photocopying weighed against fair use defense). 
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dom access memory of a computer.24 They also believe that digitaliza­
tion puts an end to copyright's "first sale" doctrine, which has allowed 
sharing of one's CD with a friend or reselling a book after finishing it, 
since to redistribute a digital copy of a work requires making a copy in 
the transmission process.25 Copyright industries are experimenting 
with technical measures to prevent unauthorized private copying of 
copyrighted materials,26 and they convinced Congress to pass the 
DMCA, which grants them rights to control circumvention of these 
technical measures and the making and distribution of technologies 
capable of circumvention.27 
This lays the groundwork for the "pay-per-use" economy in digital 
information that some copyright industries seem to desire (p. 27). Use 
of technical measures makes the public's access to ideas and informa­
tion "contingent on the copyright holders' marketing plans, and puts 
the ability of consumers to engage in legal uses of the material in those 
texts within the copyright holder's unconstrained discretion. In es­
sence, that 's an exclusive right to use" (p. 83). Litman's principal ob­
jection is that this transformation of copyright was accomplished by a 
"sleight of hand," not an informed debate on the merits with an op­
portunity for meaningful public input (p. 86). To the extent that copy­
right has been so transformed, Litman would agree with the copyright 
industries that the public does not comply with the law. Her preferred 
solution, however, is not beefed-up enforcement or copyright re­
education camp for the public,28 but rather a good copyright lawyer to 
represent the public's interests. Much of Digital Copyright is given 
over to explaining what the public's copyright lawyer ought to do to 
turn things around.29 
· 
24. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 21, at 140-44; White Paper, supra note 22, at 65-66. 
25. White Paper, supra note 22, at 90-95 (arguing that the first sale rule does not apply 
to sharing of digital information). The first sale right limits the distribution right, not the re­
production right, so insofar as sharing a digital copy involves reproduction, that copying is 
not covered by the first sale privilege of 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000). Litman expresses dismay 
about the loss of first sale rights. Pp. 81-82. 
26. See, e.g., Digital Dilemma, supra note 21, at 153-71. 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). Litman recounts the history of the enactment of the DMCA 
in chapter 9 of Digital Copyright. 
28. Litman observes that the public has been resistant to copyright education efforts. 
P. 114. 
29. Being the public's copyright lawyer is, in Litman's view, the job of Congress. P. 74. 
Litman believes, however, that "Congress lacks the interest, expertise, and institutional 
memory to represent the public on this partictJlar project, and has found significant political 
benefits in deferring to the interests the legislation affects." P. 74. Congress also has its own 
copyright lawyer to draw upon, namely, the Register of Copyrights whose Office is part of 
the Library of Congress. 
Unfortunately the Copyright Office has tended to view copyright owners as its real constitu­
ency and has spent the past ten years moving firmly into the content industry's pocket. The 
reasons are unexceptional: The office has a limited budget, and relies on the goodwill of its 
regular clients. Copyright Office policy staff often come from and return to law firms that 
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Ill. CAN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE COPYRIGHT LEGISLATIVE AND 
POLICY PROCESS BE REPAIRED? 
The breakdown of the copyright legislative policy process leads 
Litman to imagine a role for the public's copyright lawyer in 
construct[ing] a copyright law that affords members of the public the op­
portunity to read, see, hear, and otherwise experience, download, buy, 
borrow, and keep copies of all or at least most of the works that are out 
there, while according ample compensation to the authors and publishers 
of copyrighted works, and encouraging them to produce and disseminate 
as many copyrighted works as they are able to. (pp. 72-73) 
The revised law should, she thinks, "be about three pages long, should 
strike more folks than not as more fair than not, and should be suffi­
ciently intuitive to appeal to schoolchildren" (p. 73) .  Litman then sets 
forth the principal norms that she thinks should be embodied in a re­
vised copyright law for an information age. 
Litman recommends jettisoning the reproduction right of current 
copyright law because digital information cannot be used without 
making copies, and hence, the reproduction right is no longer a useful 
mechanism by which to distinguish activities that copyright owners 
should be able to control and those that they should not.30 Instead, she 
suggests that copyright owners should have an exclusive right to con­
trol commercial exploitations of their works as well as a right to con­
trol large-scale interferences with such commercial operations:31 She 
regularly represent copyright owners. Perhaps most importantly, the Copyright Office relies 
on the copyright bar to protect it from budget cuts and incursions on its turf. 
P. 74. 
Litman might have invoked public choice theory to explain why Congress and other 
government entities have been so receptive to copyright industry concerns, but this is not her 
wont. 
30. P. 180. A recent report of the National Research Council makes a similar observa­
tion about the reproduction right. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 21, at 140-45. It is 
worth noting that copyright law protects more than digital works, and as to other works, the 
reproduction right may continue to be useful. Litman does not discuss whether repeal of the 
reproduction right or adoption of a narrower set of exclusive rights is consistent with treaty 
obligations the United States has under the Berne Convention and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See Berne Convention for the Pro­
tection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971; see 
also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia­
tions, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS - THE LEGAL TEXTS 2-3 (Gatt Secretariat ed., 
1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF URUGUAY ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex JC: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, reprinted in RESULTS OF URUGUAY ROUND, supra, at 6-19, 
365-403. 
31. Pp. 180-81. This might mean, for example, that Napster would be liable for its inter­
ference with the recording industry's commercialization of sound recordings, although indi­
vidual user sharing of music would not give rise to liability. P. 181. But see infra note 35 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that Napster should not have been liable for copyright in­
fringement). 
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trusts courts to engage in common law decisionmaking to apply these 
rules in light of a revised law's normative purposes.32 Litman proposes 
a statutory affirmation of the public's rights in copyright, including 
rights to access, read, view, and listen to publicly available works; to 
cite, extract, and re-use facts and ideas they contain; and, if necessary, 
to circumvent technical protections to access facts and ideas.33 Litman 
would return copyright law to the era in which this law was conceived 
as a bargain under which copyright owners get assurance they will be 
compensated for making their works available in exchange for which 
the public would get access to and the ability to make reasonable uses 
of the works.34 
Although articulating a framework for a new deal for copyright is 
an important step toward achieving the goal, . Litman proffers few 
ideas about how the copyright policy process itself might be reformed. 
At one point, she posits the existence of a hypothetical benevolent 
despot and explains how the despot might configure copyright law if 
its goal was to promote the development of new technologies 
(pp. 172-73). Such a despot would permit the emergence of innovative, 
Internet-based technologies, such as Napster and MP3.com, for dis­
seminating music free from copyright controls.35 Litman points to sev­
eral historical examples to illustrate the soundness of such a decision, 
explaining that some major copyright industries - including the sound 
recording, cable television, and videocassette industries - began in 
the shelter of copyright limitations.36 Of course, Litman does not really 
32. P. 181. Litman believes that the highly specific exceptions in the current copyright 
law could then be repealed as unnecessary .. P. 182. While I find those exceptions as unread­
able as Litman does, I do not object to their continued presence in the copyright statute be­
cause they are workable accommodations for the affected industries and do not impact the 
public. 
33. Pp. 175-84. Litman would not allow the public's rights to be overridden by contrac­
tual provisions or technical measures aiming to undermine them. Pp. 175-84. Oddly enough, 
Litman does not suggest a reaffirmation of the fair use principle, even though it often limits 
the scope of copyright as to clearly commercial activities. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that 2Live Crew's commercial sound recording of a 
"Pretty Woman" rap parody qualified for fair use). Litman also does not mention the dura­
tion of copyright she thinks is appropriate. 
34. Chapter 5 discusses changing concepts of copyright. Years ago, copyright was 
thought to provide a limited monopoly to authors as a quid pro quo for benefits to society. 
P. 78. A more recent conception is that copyright is a property right that gives authors and 
publishers the right to control all uses of their works. P. 81. 
35. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (service that 
allowed users to share copies of MP3 files via the Internet was liable for indirect copyright 
infringement); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(making copies of sound recordings for service enabling users to listen to previously pur­
chased music held to be copyright infringement). 
36. P. 173. The Supreme Court twice ruled that cable television retransmission of broad­
cast signals did not infringe the public performance right of copyright law, even though it 
was clearly a commercial operation. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 
U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Tele., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). Eventually, 
the public performance right was extended to encompass cable retransmission of broadcast 
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advocate the appointment of a benevolent despot. The suggestiOn is 
just a device for leaping over the broken policy process and offering 
an alternative copyright policy for.discussion. 
Apart from this, Litman says only that "consumers' widespread 
noncompliance (with strict copyright norms] offers a very real ray of 
hope."37 If " [p]eople don't obey laws they don't believe in" (p. 195) 
and if " [g]overnments find it difficult to enforce laws that only a hand­
ful of people obey" (p. 195), then she believes that copyright law will 
eventually have to change or become irrelevant.38 For her a lesson of 
the Napster controversy is that " [i]f 137 million members of the gen­
eral public copy, save, transmit, and distribute content witho�t paying 
attention to the written copyright rules, those rules are in danger of 
becoming irrelevant" (p. 114). Yet copyright would seem very relevant 
if the recording industry can get injunctions not only against Napster, 
but against other peer-to-peer technology providers, such as Aimster 
and Grokster.39 
It is understandable that Litman has so little confidence in 
Congress as an instrument of change toward a more enlightened copy­
right policy. After all, she knows better than anyone else the history of 
copyright industry domination of the legislative process. Moreover, 
her participation in the legislative struggles over the DMCA left her 
even more disillusioned than her academic study of the subject. The 
DMCA, she· asserts, "is substantially more pernicious than the bill 
originally proposed by the . . .  White Paper" (p. 145). The White Paper 
bill was ''breathtakingly expansive but it was short. It didn't improve 
the copyright law's general level of incomprehensibility but it didn't 
exacerbate it either" (p. 145). The DMCA, by contrast, is "riddled 
with ambiguities, internal inconsistencies, contradictions, and obfusca-
programming under one of the negotiated provisions that Litman criticizes. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 
101, 111 (2000) (the former defining "public performance" as including transmissions, and 
the latter allowing cable systems' secondary transmission of broadcast programs). 
37. P. 194. Litman adds: 
If someone claims that a law provides such and such, but such and such seems to make no 
sense, then perhaps that isn't really the law, or wasn't intended to be the way the law 
worked, or was the law at one time but not today, or is one of those laws, like sodomy law, 
that it is OK .to ignore. Our current copyright statute has more than merely a provision or 
two that doesn't make a lot of sense; it's chock full of them. 
P. 114. 
38. Pp. 111-14. Litman makes a passing reference to "copyright police," p. 194, but she 
does not seem to think it likely that serious attempts will be made to enforce copyright laws 
against individual users. 
39. See A&M Records, 239 F.3d 1004 (holding injunction overbroad but remanding for 
narrower drafting. See, e.g., Brad King, Aimster the Latest to Chime In, WIRED, Nov. 14, 
2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,48255,00.html (discussing litigation 
between the recording industry and Aimster); Complaint in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Inc., available at http://Www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_ v _Grokster/20011002mgm_ v _grokster_ 
complaint.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002). 
· 
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tory prose" (p. 142). There is, Litman intimates, no Mr. Smith in Con­
gress whose goal is to bring about a more balanced copyright policy. · 
While I am no admirer of the DMCA, I see in it more of an at­
tempt at balanced copyright law than she does. For one thing, the 
DMCA soundly rejected the copyright industry's position that Inter­
net service providers ("ISPs") should be strictly liable for copyright 
infringement of users.40 Instead, Congress enacted a broad set of safe 
harbor provisions pertaining to the transmission, storage, and caching 
of copyrighted information, as well as protecting information location 
tools, such as search engines, against unwarranted claims of infringe­
ment.41 This was a victory not only for ISPs and Internet firms, but also 
for members of the public.42 
Second, an important backdrop to the DMCA legislative debate 
was a digital copyright treaty negotiated in Geneva in December 1996. 
This treaty repudiated numerous highly protectionist provisions ini­
tially supported by the Clinton Administration and adopted instead a 
balanced set of copyright rules.43 Congressional ratification of this bal­
anced treaty was in the public interest and is very much part of the 
current digital copyright policy landscape. Litman only briefly men­
tions the treaty and its far more balanced copyright rules (pp. 128-29). 
Third, while I agree that the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions 
are in some respects worse than the White Paper's proposal,44 they are 
40. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 22, at 114-24 (asserting online service providers 
were strictly liable for copyright infringements of their users). 
41. 17 u.s.c. § 512 (2000). 
42. Not only did the safe harbors ensure that ISPs and Internet search engines could 
continue to provide useful services to Internet users free from copyright owner controls, but 
the DMCA also protected user privacy by providing that ISPs had no duty to monitor users 
and set up stiff notice and counternotice requirements so that users would be protected 
against vague or false claims of copyright infringement. See id. § 512(c)(3), (f), (g). 
43. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/89 (Dec. 20, 1996). A very similar treaty was concluded on the same date con­
cerning intellectual property protection for sound recordings. See WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/90 
(Dec. 20, 1996); see also Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96. See 
generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 
(1997) (analyzing provisions in the draft treaty and the treaty finally adopted). U.S. officials 
initially supported provisions that would have given copyright owners the right to control 
temporary as well as permanent copies of works, that threatened fair use and other limita­
tions and exceptions to copyright law, and that would have adopted a White Paper-like anti­
circumvention rule. The final treaty only required signatories to provide some protection 
against circumvention of technical measures, omitted the proposed provision on temporary 
copies, and included an agreed upon statement of interpretation of the treaty endorsing the 
continued viability of exceptions and limitations in copyright and foreseeing that new excep-
tions might be needed for the digital environment. 
· 
44. The White Paper did not recommend outlawing the act of circumventing technical 
measures. See White Paper, supra note 22, Appendix 1, at 6. The DMCA, however, makes 
circumventing access controls illegal. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A) (2000). 
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better in other ways.45 There may be more wiggle-room in the DMCA 
rules and more ambiguity in the legislative history than Litman per­
ceives.46 Fourth, Congress has taken some heed of public interest con­
cerns as to legislation aimed at giving copyright-like protection to fac­
tual compilations, despite strong support for the legislation from 
major publishers.47 
While copyright industry groups will certainly continue to have in­
fluence in the copyright policy process, a great many organizations 
represent interests that overlap with those of the public at large, and 
some of them - universities and other educational institutions, con­
sumer protection groups, scientific and technical organizations, com­
puter industry groups, and consumer electronics manufacturers -
may become more effective lobbyists on copyright matters in future 
years. Congress might also establish something akin to the Office of 
Technology Assessment to provide it with independent advice about 
policy options when legislating on intellectual property and other is­
sues responding to challenges presented by new technologies.48 In 
Congressman Rick Boucher, the public has a would-be Mr. Smith who 
45. The White Paper legislation would have outlawed technologies if the primary pur­
pose or effect was to circumvent technical measures._ White Paper, supra note 22, Appendix 
1, at 6. The DMCA makes illegal technologies that are primarily designed or produced to 
circumvent technical measures. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l) (2000). The White Paper leg­
islation contained no exceptions or limitations on its scope. White Paper, supra note 22, Ap­
pendix 1, at 6. Although the DMCA has too few exceptions and limitations, at least it recog­
nizes the legitimacy of many acts of circumvention and of making tools for circumvention. 
See id. § 120l(d)-(j); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why 
the Anti-circumvention Rules Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 543-46 
(1999) (explaining why the DMCA needs more exceptions and limitations than it currently 
has). The DMCA anti-circumvention provision requires the Librarian of Congress to hold 
periodic hearings to determine if additional exceptions are needed and empowers the Li­
brarian to issue rules to provide further exceptions. Id. § 1201(a)(l)(B)-(C). The first set of 
hearings and rulemaking proceeding added two new exceptions to the anti-circumvention 
rules. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556-01 (Oct. 28, 2001) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 2d). 
46. Courts could look to several provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c) to limit the applica­
tion of the DMCA rules. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 45, at 537-43 (discussing 1201(c) 
and other exceptions); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing 
Works: The Development of an Access Right in .U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY (Hugh Hansen ed., forthcoming June 2002) (suggesting that 
1201(c) may permit some fair use circumventions). 
47. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Re­
cent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
793 (1999) (discussing two such bills H.R. 2281 and H.R. 354). 
48. The Office of Technology Assessment wrote a number of reports on intellectual 
property issues. See., e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, FINDING 
A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1992); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. 
CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES THE LAW 
(1989); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (1986). 
1500 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1488 
is committed to legislation restoring balance in copyright law that was 
lost by enactment of the DMCA.49 If the public once again becomes 
engaged in copyright . policy issues, this ·may attract supporters to 
Boucher's bills. 
Public involvement in the· copyright policy process is not without 
precedent. In the 1980s, while the Sony Betama:x case was pending be­
fore the Supreme Court, consumer groups actively lobbied for legisla­
tion to protect personal use copying and against copyright industry­
supported legislation that would have outlawed it.50 Similar lobbying 
in the 1990's led to enactment of a little-noticed exemption for non­
commercial copying of sound recordings that Congress hoped would 
finally resolve the controversy about private copying of music.51 If the 
sound recording industry does not make digital music broadly avail­
able on reasonable terms, it is quite possible that legislation will be 
needed to promote broader public access to and ability to use re­
corded music. Senator Orrin Hatch has made clear that he will be 
watching developments in this area.52 Also, copyright industry groups 
may become overconfident and go too far in pressing their legislative 
agenda. The Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") has 
recently urged enactment of legislation to mandate installation of 
technical measures into all interactive digital devices.53 This may trig­
ger a counter-reaction by affected industry groups and the general 
public, although this obviously remains to be seen. 
Executive Branch developments could also help to change the 
policy environment. If, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice 
49. See, e.g., Representative Rick Boucher (D-VA), Address at American University, 
Washington College of Law (Mar. 6, 2001), available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/ 
intelpro/20010306boucher.asp (concerning proposals for changes to the fair use doctrine in 
the context of digital and Internet media). Boucher sponsored an alternative bill to the 
DMCA to provide for a minimalist implementation of the digital copyright treaties. See 
Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1998). 
50. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE AND THE 
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR (1987). 
51. Audio Home Recording Act, Pub. L. No. 102"563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (now codi­
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10). The exemption for noncommercial copying of analog and some 
digital sound recordings is codified Id. § 1008. Congress also passed the Fairness in Music 
Licensing Act that expanded an existing exception allowing commercial establishments to 
play music without paying royalties to copyright owners in the music. See Pub. L. No. 105-
298 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)). 
52. Senator Hatch has expressed concern about this and held hearings on digital music 
services. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearings on "Music on the Internet: Is 
There an Upside to Downloading?," available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/ 
wl7112000.htm. Senator Hatch's statement at that hearing on July 11, 2000, can be found at 
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciaryn11200_ogh.htm. 
53. See Declan McCulloch, New Copyright Bill Heading to DC, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 7, 
2001, available at http://www. ired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46655,00.html (discussing the 
Security Systems Standards and Certification Act ("SSSCA") that would mandate installa­
tion of standard technical protection measures in all interactive digital devices). 
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determined that the member firms of the Recording Industry Associa­
tion of America ("RIAA'') or MPAA were engaging in anti­
competitive conduct in the development or distribution of new digital 
entertainment products and instituted lawsuits challenging this con­
duct as a violation of the antitrust laws, the industry's control over the 
policy process would be lessened,s4 A similar result would flow from a 
possible Federal Trade Commission charge that some of these firms 
were engaging in unfair trade practices.ss Even in the absence of such 
developments, it is surely true that the entertainment industry does 
not enjoy the same level of support from the Bush administration as it 
had from the Clinton administration. There is, moreover, reason to 
think that some Bush administration officials - notably John 
Ashcroft - may support more balanced copyright policies.s6 
Courts may also have a role to play in protecting the public interest 
in digital copyright law. This can happen in several ways. Courts may 
decide that existing law.does not reach as far as copyright owners as­
sert; that some new limiting principles are needed for copyright law to 
achieve its purposes; or that constitutional limitations preclude con­
struing the law to reach certain conduct. Sony Betamax is the best­
known example of the first category,57 but several digital copyright de­
cisions may be cited as well, including Galoob v. Nintendo,s8 Lotus v. 
Borland,s9 and RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia. 60 Computer Associates 
v. Altai,61 Sega v. A ccolade,62 and Religious Technology Center v. Net-
54. See Laura M. Holson & Rick Lyman, U.S. Inquiry is Raising Speculation in Holly­
wood, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at Cl (reporting on investigation into possible anti­
competitive conduct by motion picture studios as to online.rnovie services). 
55. The European Union has been investigating whether the country-coding of DVD 
movies is a device to overprice DVDs. See, e.g., European Union Probes DVD Pricing, SAN 
JOSE MERC. NEWS, June 12, 2001, at 3G. 
56. When Ashcroft was Attorney General for the state of Missouri, he filed an arnicus 
brief in support of Sony in the Betamax case. Ashcroft was also the Senate sponsor of an al­
ternative bill to the DMCA. 
57. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that 
movie studios were not entitled to control sale of videotape recorders because machines had 
substantial noninfringing uses). 
· 
58. Lewis Galoob Toys, inc. v. Nintendo of Arn., 964 F.2.d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that it was not contributory infringement to sell Game Genie program so users could change 
the play of Nintendo games). 
59. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'!, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff d by an equally di­
vided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (holding that the command hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 was 
not protectable by copyright law because .it was a method of operating a computer). 
60. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
1999) (ruling that the Audio Home Recording Act did not require the maker of the MP3 
player to install anti-copying technology). 
61. Computer Assocs. Int'! v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that ele­
ments of programs necessary to achieve compatibility are unprotectable by copyright law). 
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com63 are examples of the second category. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose64 
and Feist v. Rural Telephone65 may be examples of the third. In several 
of these cases, the fair use defense proved to be the kind of flexible 
balancing rule that Litman endorses for copyright law in the informa­
tion age.66 
Of course, counter-examples exist as well. The most pernicious de­
cision on digital copyright issues - one that Litman has previously 
written about but scarcely mentions in this book - is the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in MAI v. Peak,67 which held that software copy­
rights could be infringed when an unlicensed person turned on a li­
censed firm's computer, thereby booting all the software in the system. 
This was not only a wrong decision on the merits,68 but its underlying 
premise - that temporary copies of copyrighted material in the ran­
dom access memory of a computer infringe the reproduction right -
inadvertently provided copyright industries and the Clinton 
Administration with one of the central tenets of the new high protec­
tionism: that any access to or use of a copyrighted work in digital form 
infringes the reproduction right unless authorized.69 As mentioned 
62. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that it is 
fair use to make intermediate copies of computer programs for a legitimate purpose, such as 
trying to make a compatible program). 
63. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that on­
line service provider was not contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright infringement 
committed by a user prior to receiving notice of infringement). 
64. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (stressing importance of 
criticism and parody to ongoing creativity which copyright and the First Amendment are 
intended to bring about). 
65. Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (raising constitutional as 
well as statutory objections to claim that white pages listings of telephone directories could 
be copyrighted). 
66. This includes Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (fair use to parody "Pretty 
Woman" song); Sony-Betamax, 464 U.S. 417 (fair use to make time-shifting copies of broad­
cast television shows); Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (fair use to decompile a program for 
purposes of making a compatible program); Galoob v. Nintendo, 964 F.2d 965 (fair use to 
use Game Genie program to alter the play of Nintendo games); RTC v. Netcom, 907 F. 
Supp. 1361 (fair use analysis reinforced ruling against contributory liability for online service 
provider for user infringement). See also Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use For Computer Pro­
grams and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob 
and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993) (discussing implications of these decisions for 
many uses of digital information). 
67. MAI Sys. Co. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). Litman has criti­
cized this decision. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 29 (1994). 
68. The decision was so clearly incorrect that Congress legislatively overturned it. See 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title III, Sec. 302, 112 Stat. 2887 
(1998), now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117(c); Litman, supra note 67; David Nimmer, Brains 
and Other Paraphenalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996). But see Gins­
burg, supra note 21 (arguing that MAI v. Peak was correctly decided). 
69. See White Paper, supra note 22, at 64-65. 
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above, the WIPO Copyright Treaty rejected this view.70 Moreover, 
U.S. caselaw does not support the view that the reproduction right 
provides copyright owners with an exclusive right to control all uses of 
copyrighted information. 
There are, of course, some repeat-player advantages for copyright 
industries in the courts just as there are in the legislature,71 but it is too 
soon to give up on judicial rulings as a means for achieving a better 
balance in digital copyright law. One advantage of becoming a more 
senior scholar in the intellectual property field is seeing the ebb and 
flow of decisions on new technology issues. I was once dismayed by 
the first round of software copyright decisions that were highly protec­
tionist for substantially the same reason, in my view, that courts haye 
sometimes construed copyright law very broadly in digital copyright 
cases: concern about the impact that decisions limiting the scope of 
protection might have for the viability of the affected industry.72 Over 
time, the software copyright decisions became more moderate in tone 
and substance as courts recognized the negative consequences for 
competition, innovation, and the public interest that would flow result 
from highly protectionist rules. Perhaps a similar pattern may emerge 
in the digital copyright caselaw in the 2000s. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For more than two hundred years, the United States has con­
sciously adopted a plethora of information policies aimed at promot­
ing the generation of useful information, its widespread dissemination, 
and freedoms to use information both privately and publicly. It has 
done so through a wide array of mechanisms, including passage of 
copyright laws, but also by support for public education and libraries; 
support for basic science; governmental collection and publication of 
information (e.g., census and weather data, laws and judicial opin-
70. See supra note 43. 
71. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 6, at 901-02; Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright 
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. l ,  67-69 (2001). 
72. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (extending copyright protection to the structure, 
sequence and organization of computer programs so that the software industry would be 
adequately protected; announcing a very broad test for software copyright infringement). 
Numerous cases initially endorsed Whelan's approach to analyzing software copyright in­
fringement. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc., v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). 
The turning point in this line of cases was the Second Circuit's decision in Computer Assocs. 
Int'! v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting Whelan's broad test for copyright 
infringement as well as the same economic argument for broad copyright protection for 
software; announcing a narrower test for copyright infringement). The Altai test displaced 
the Whelan test in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 
(11th Cir. 1996); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Sega 
Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 199_2). 
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ions); subsidized mailing rates for newspapers, magazines, and books; 
freedom of information laws; and broadcast regulations, to name just a 
few. Many of the freedoms Americans hold dear - including freedom 
to send and receive information, and to express and publish one's 
ideas - depend on a supporting infrastructure of enlightened infor­
mation policies. 
Copyright has played an important role in this enlightened infor­
mation policy. By providing reassurance that authors could benefit 
from the commercial value of their works, copyright law successfully 
promoted the creation and dissemination of many · works of author­
ship, just as the Founders hoped. This is a function for copyright law 
that Litman would preserve. But limitations on the scope of rights are 
also important in promoting enlightened information policy.73 The 
1976 Act, for example, forbids copyright protection for ideas and in­
formation in protected works,74 grants rights to control certain public 
although not private uses of the works,75 and privileges fair uses and 
redistribution of purchased copies (the latter making libraries and 
bookstores legal).76 
· · 
Digital Copyright explains . how and why some of these limiting 
doctrines have been eroding and why the public should care. Litman 
points out that "[t]he current digital copyright agenda seeks to supply 
copyright answers to a whole range of basic policy questions ranging 
from who is entitled to access, to what, and on whose terms, to 
whether citizens have any private interest whatsoever in personal 
data" (p. 28). Litman would address those questions head-on, but 
would provide quite different answers than the copyright industries. 
She senses that basic freedoms are at stake and wants to assure their 
preservation. Unfortunately, the chances of reforming copyright law 
and the copyright policy . process seem dim unless the public once 
again becomes engaged in copyright issues and takes action to insist 
73. In other writings, Litman has emphasized the importance of copyright limitations in 
promoting enlightened information policy. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright and Informa­
tion Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1992); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). 
74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does copyright protection for a work of 
authorship extend to any idea, process, procedure, system, method of operation, principle, 
concept or discovery, regardless of �ow it is embodied in the work.") The "idea/expression" 
distinction predates the Copyright Act of 1976, but the 1976 Act was the first copyright stat­
ute to embody this distinction and expressly provide that processes, procedures, systems and 
methods of operation were beyond the scope of copyright protection. So although the 1976 
Act broadened copyright protection in some respects, see supra note 14 and accompanying 
text, it also contained important limitations on copyright protection. See id. § 103 (copyright 
in compilation of facts does not extend to preexisting data). 
75. Id. § 106(3)-(5); see also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 (fair use); 109 (first sale limitation) (2000). The nonstatutory doc­
trine of copyright misuse also limits the power of copyright owners in exercising their rights. 
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property 
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999). 
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on changes. Litman surely hopes that her book will be both a wakeup 
call and a call to action. 
Litman implicitly aims her argument not just at the slumbering 
public (whom she must know will be disinclined to buy or read a book 
on digital copyright law, let alone to demand immediate Congressional 
action), but also at copyright professionals - and possibly even to 
members of Congress and their staffs - who have reason to worry 
that the public simply will not abide by stringent copyright rules even 
if industry groups are able to persuade Congress to enact and the 
courts to enforce them. Wouldn't it be better, she asks, to have a sim­
pler, more coherent, and more balanced law that people would actu­
ally respect than to have the engorged law of your dreams that no one 
but you can understand or is willing to abide by? 
Litman might have done more to formulate strategies for reform­
ing the copyright policy process, but by writing Digital Copyright, she 
has done a great service in translating the arcana of copyright law into 
plain English, in masterfully explicating the breakdown of the copy­
right policy process, and in re-conceptualizing copyright law for an in­
formation age. A new and fairer deal for copyright is achievable and 
worth the effort necessary to bring it about. Excessive copyright pro­
tection impedes the progress of science, and contravenes the Enlight­
enment policy embodied in the Constitution. Digital technology may 
have disrupted the old copyright balance, but that doesn't mean that 
balance is no longer necessary, as some copyright industry groups 
seem to believe. The balance simply needs to be recalibrated. Public 
interest limitations on copyright also need to be more clearly ex­
pressed. Digital Copyright provides useful guidance on how to achieve 
these important goals. We ignore the lessons it teaches at our peril. 
